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power over the property which was not subject to an ascertainable
standard and, therefore, the property subject to the power was
included in H's gross estate in computing the federal estate tax. The
court further held that although W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 36
(Michie 1966) limits the exercise of such powers to lawful exercise,
such a limitation is not sufficient to be termed an ascertainable
standard and thereby gain the favored exclusionary treatment under
the federal estate tax. Potter v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 545
(N. D. W. Va. 1967).
The granting of a life estate with a power of disposition over the
remainder no longer creates a fee simple in West Virginia. W. VA.
CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 36 (Michie 1966). But even so, the estate
planner should limit a power of appointment for the benefit of the
life tenant to an ascertainable standard if he wants to keep the value
of the property subject to the power from being included in the life
tenant's gross estate for estate tax purposes. Treas. Reg. 20.20411(c)(2) (1958) as amended T.D. 6582, 1962 Cum. Bull. 177.
Evidence--Circumstantial Evidence in a Homocide Prosecution
D was indicted for murder of her lover's wife and, on the same
indictment, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Testimony
placed D at the scene of the crime at the proper time and with a
motive; however, no homicide weapon was produced. Testimony
of deceased's husband, the lover, was that D usually carried a gun.
The only weapon introduced into evidence, said by the lover to have
been in his wife's possession at the time of the shooting was found
where the lover had hidden it. No ballistics tests were made to
determine if the death bullet was fired from this gun. Held, affirmed.
Positive evidence of D having a gun in her possession is not essential.
The jury determines the truth of testimony and a reversal is prevented
here because the evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime was sufficient to warrant its submission to the
jury. State v. Bailey, 155 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1967).
This case attracts immediate attention, upon first reading, due to
the failure to positively connect the defendant with a homicide
weapon. However, research reveals no case in which the actual production of a homicide weapon is an essential element of a homicide
offense. As stated by the court, circumstantial evidence can be
used to convict one of a crime with the jury determining the weight
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to be given the evidence. This being so, then the importance of
producing a homicide weapon is a matter of fact, not law, to be
determined by the jury.
Habitual Criminals-Jury Trial
The petitioner, P, was convicted of a felony punishable by an
indeterminate prison sentence. Pursuant to the habitual criminal
statutes an information was filed by the State charging that P had
previously been convicted of a felony and imprisoned. P denied
being the same person named in the information. The court, without
informing P of the necessity of impaneling a jury to try the issue of
identity, proceeded without a jury to try the issue raised by the
information. The court held the charges in the information to be
correct and added an additional five years to P's indeterminate
sentence. In his habeas corpus petition P alleged that because the
court did not impanel a jury to determine the issue of identity the
court was without jurisdiction to impose the additional sentence.
Held, void as to the additional sentence, but the petitioner must
serve the remainder of his indeterminate sentence. The right to trial
by jury in habitual criminal proceedings is of such character that it
cannot be waived. Habitual criminal proceedings providing for
additional punishment of felons are wholly statutory. Thus courts
have no inherent or common law power or jurisdiction in such proceedings. It is generally held that statutes in derogation of common
law are strictly construed in favor of the felon. The statute, W. VA.
CODE ch. 61 art. 11 § 19 (Michie 1966), specifically states that
when the identity alleged in an information is at issue, a jury shall
be impaneled to determine the issue. This clearly confers jurisdiction,
in such matters, upon the jury and not upon the court acting in lieu
of a jury. The court has consistently held habitual criminal statutes
to be mandatory and jurisdictional. Ringer v. Boles, 157 S.E.2d
554 (W. Va. 1967).
The narrow holding of this case is that in the habitual criminal
statutes the word shall means must and the lower court must follow,
to the letter, the procedure set out in the statute.
Mandamus-Eminent Domain
In an original proceeding in mandamus, the petitioner sought to
compel the State Road Commissioner to institute against the
petitioner a proceeding in eminent domain in order to ascertain and
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